Contra: Fewer people, fewer soldiers: We Germans are not a power of the future. By Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff
If there really were a “magical Jeannie” – like the genie in the bottle in the TV-series – a genie who fulfilled her master’s every wish, then Germany would sit on the U.N. Security Council no later than tomorrow. But since wishes aren’t enough in the real world, a few thorny questions have cropped up along the path to New York. Is an ambitious campaign for a Security Council seat in the German interest? Is the need urgent enough to justify the political costs? Does the German strategy promise success or just disgrace?
The best sentence from the German application reads: whoever pays calls the shots. Indeed, with 8.6 percent of the U.N. budget, Germany is the third largest contributor. That should entitle one to a say in the matter. But with this checkbook diplomacy German grandeur also comes to an end. It is certainly true that the Security Council reflects the power structures of 1945 and not those of today. But this only means that the Council should recruit members from Asia, Africa, or South America. Europe is already overrepresented. Today, three of the five permanent members come from Europe, namely England, France, and (half of) Russia. Why a fourth European power should become a permanent member remains a mystery.
And why Germany in particular? Unlike India, Germany is not a power of the future. Its economy is stagnating. Its share of world trade is falling. Ditto for the number of soldiers and citizens. The Federal Republic is a shriveling country with growing ambitions. Real statesmanship would be the sound management of this minefield. Instead the advocates of a Security Council seat are acting like the hotrods of foreign policy. They rev their souped-up engines and hope that no one will realize how little horsepower they have underneath the hood.
If Germany were to become a permanent member of the Council, it would have to participate in every vote on war and peace, and it would have to assume its share of the responsibility for the outcome. That means: pay and send soldiers. Yet no one but Luxembourg spends as little on its military as Germany: 1.2 percent of the GDP. Is the country really ready to allocate considerably more funds to foreign aid and defense only to sit at the table with the big boys? A vote of confidence in the Bundestag was required even to deploy troops against the terrorist regime in Afghanistan, a move that was purely defensive and prompted no objections on ethical grounds or on the basis of human rights. What will Germany do in murkier cases if the Security Council obliges it to take a position? Is it really willing to give up the “culture of restraint” of which it is so proud?
Advocates of the German candidacy argue that abandoning it would lead to the “garden gnome option” of German foreign policy. Yet there is no such automatism. In fact, Germany will have to shoulder more responsibilities in the future – even without a Security Council seat. But [without a seat] the government will be able to pick and choose its engagements depending on its power, means, desire, and in accordance with its national interests. Renouncing the German candidacy will not release the Federal Republic into a realm of irresponsibility; rather it will increase its freedom of action in foreign policy. Germany, after all, is not a superpower but a middle power.
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