And how then should we have such interests in remote countries overseas?
Of course there is a well-developed German merchant navy which sails all the seas, and both our interest and our national duty demand that we afford it a certain degree of protection. We therefore entirely share the desire that the German naval flag should be flown on all the seas and that it should be prepared for demonstrations and, where necessary, for small, rapid actions in the Far East, in the Pacific, in Central and South America, wherever semi-barbaric conditions require this. But these interests call for no battle-fleets, no armoured giants swallowing up many millions of Marks; these are after all quite useless for the above-mentioned tasks. A few dozen sound, fast, fairly small vessels of war would entirely suffice for these purposes. Apart from these, complete protection for our coasts (which are on the whole fairly inaccessible), equipped with the best available defensive matériel, would of course in all circumstances be necessary. But, as is known, the German naval building plan goes far beyond these requirements; what is more, our tremendous construction of naval armament comes at a time when the whole naval system is in a highly critical situation. The question: do we need armour, or guns, or strength, or speed? has not yet been settled, but will, if we are not wholly deceived, be solved more and more in favour of the last alternative. [ . . . ]
Often a phase of unconsciousness, or of semi-consciousness, is the prelude to the most fruitful developments, and it is only after some time has passed that one sees in retrospect why in fact things had to turn out as they did. We hope that this may be true, too, of the plan for the foundation of a navy, which today is really no longer a plan but a fact which is soon to be completely accomplished and which has to be reckoned with as such. We too would gladly grow used to welcoming the accomplished fact with joy if the comprehensive plan for the founding of a navy helped, among other things, to give our ambitions for sea-Power status a real, tangible background which would be truly supportive of our body politic. This, however, is something which the German Reich can only acquire by embarking upon a judicious and energetic colonial policy. This, we are persuaded, is the only way of making our expanded Navy justifiable in the long run, that is to say, of gaining a return on the substantial expenditure which it involves. [ . . . ]
We can add yet a fourth point of view which is helpful in dealing with the question raised here. The present has, rightly, been referred to as an age of travels and of geographical surveys. In these respects we Germans too have of late been busily at work. Our compatriots are engaged in research expeditions in all the quarters of the globe. The number of our geographical periodicals, most of which are extremely sound, as of our geographical societies is steadily growing; interest in geographical, ethnographic and anthropological studies has been powerfully stimulated by scientific research and popular illustrated accounts, and is now very much more widespread among us than it was in earlier decades. This is certainly encouraging. But are we to be and remain only theoreticians in this field too, merely collecting and researching for the benefit of the world at large? Are we to continue sitting in our studies and making ourselves familiar with all the quarters of the globe, without finding a second national home anywhere overseas? Is this a situation which can in the long run be reconciled, we will not say with our national honour, but with urgent national requirements? [ . . . ] Should the Kaiser and the Reich, should the Reich Chancellor, the Federal Council and the Reichstag, not now be thinking about doing their share in regaining for the new Reich a part of the old commercial strength? and acquiring for it, albeit belatedly, colonial possessions, without which in the long run it will not be able to survive economically?
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